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Loss of Chance, Probabilistic Cause, and Damage Calculations:  
The Error in Matsuyama v. Birnbaum and the Majority Rule of 
Damages in Many Jurisdictions More Generally 
Robert J. Rhee* 
This short commentary corrects an erroneous understanding of probabilistic 
causation in the loss-of-chance doctrine and the damage calculation method 
adopted in Matsuyama v. Birnbaum.1  The Supreme Judicial Court of 
Massachusetts is not alone.  Many other common law courts have made the 
same error, including Indiana, Nevada, New Mexico, Ohio, and Oklahoma.2  
The consistency in the mistake suggests that the error is the majority rule of 
damages.  I demonstrate here that this majority rule is based on erroneous 
mathematical reasoning and the fallacy of probabilistic logic. 
To be clear, I do not contest the propriety of the loss-of-chance doctrine 
because the underlying policy sensibly addresses the social problem of medical 
malpractice inflicted on severely ill patients.3  Without the doctrine, there 
would be no such thing as medical malpractice for patients who were more 
likely to not survive the ailment.  I only comment on the conceptual 
understanding of probabilistic causation and the nature of probability-based 
damage calculation.  The essential error in Matsuyama and other courts’ 
decisions is a misconception of the reference class from which probabilistic 
 
*Marbury Research Professor of Law; Co-Director, Business Law Program, University of Maryland Francis 
King Carey School of Law.  I thank my colleagues Andrew Blair-Stanek and Don Gifford for their helpful 
comments. 
 1. 890 N.E.2d 819 (Mass. 2008). 
 2. See, e.g., Cahoon v. Cummings, 734 N.E.2d 535, 540-41 (Ind. 2000); Perez v. Las Vegas Med. Ctr., 
805 P.2d 589, 592 (Nev. 1991); Alberts v. Schultz, 975 P.2d 1279, 1282-83 (N.M. 1999); Roberts v. Ohio 
Permanente Med. Grp., Inc., 668 N.E.2d 480, 484-85 (Ohio 1996); McKellips v. Saint Francis Hosp., Inc., 741 
P.2d 467, 476-77 (Okla. 1987). 
 3. See Robert J. Rhee, The Application of Finance Theory to Increased Risk Harms in Toxic Tort 
Litigation, 23 VA. ENVTL. L.J. 111, 146-47 (2004).  See generally Joseph H. King, Jr., Causation, Valuation, 
and Chance in Personal Injury Torts Involving Preexisting Conditions and Future Consequences, 90 YALE L.J. 
1353 (1981).  The loss-of-chance doctrine has been adopted by many jurisdictions.  See Matsuyama, 890 
N.E.2d at 828 n.23 (citing jurisdictions that have adopted loss of chance doctrine).  Some jurisdictions have 
rejected the loss-of-chance doctrine.  See Fennell v. S. Md. Hosp. Ctr., Inc., 580 A.2d 206, 215 (Md. 1990); see 
also id. at 209 n.3 (citing jurisdictions that have rejected loss-of-chance doctrine); Matsuyama, 890 N.E.2d at 
828-29 n.23 (same). 
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causation is calculated.  This error undervalues damages in certain types of 
cases where even after the medical malpractice, the plaintiff still had some 
residual chance of survival, though she ultimately died, thus begetting the cause 
of action. 
LOSS-OF-CHANCE DOCTRINE AND DAMAGE CALCULATION 
The loss-of-chance doctrine applies in medical malpractice actions in which 
the plaintiff cannot prove traditional “but for” causation because she was likely 
to die from her ailment even before the negligence.  The doctor’s negligence is 
typically the failure to diagnose the condition or to treat the condition, and as a 
result the plaintiff suffers the loss of a chance to survive.  Under a traditional 
analysis, as a matter of probability it is more likely than not that the natural 
ailment killed the plaintiff in each instance, and the doctor would escape 
liability no matter how egregious the negligence.  This situation leads to what 
scholars have called “recurring misses,” when doctors systematically escape 
liability for negligent treatment in cases involving severely ill patients.4 
Matsuyama presents a typical fact pattern.5  The plaintiff had cancer at the 
time he was examined by the defendant.  The examination failed to detect the 
cancer.  The jury found that at the time of the initial examination, the plaintiff 
had only a 37.5% chance of survival.6  The defendant’s negligence destroyed 
that small chance to survive.7  As a matter of probability, he would have 
succumbed to his natural health condition irrespective of the negligence.  Of 
course, if we had three such plaintiffs in exactly the same condition, the odds 
suggest that negligence would have killed one of them.8 
Common law courts have adopted the loss-of-chance doctrine to provide 
plaintiffs a remedy in medical malpractice cases.9  Loss of chance is an 
 
 4. See Daniel A. Farber, Recurring Misses, 19 J. LEGAL STUD. 727, 727-28 (1990); Saul Levmore, 
Probabilistic Recoveries, Restitution, and Recurring Wrongs, 19 J. LEGAL STUD. 691, 705-10 (1990). 
 5. Matsuyama, 890 N.E.2d at 824-25. 
 6. Id. at 828. 
 7. The plaintiff had a post-negligence chance of survival of 0% to 5%.  Matsuyama v. Birnbaum, 890 
N.E.2d 819, 845 (Mass. 2008). 
 8. The precise probability that at least one of the deaths would have been caused by negligence is:  [1 – 
Probability(No Negligence)] where Probability(No Negligence) = 0.625 x 0.625 x 0.625.  This means that 
based on the law of multiplication the chances of all three independent events resulting in death from ailments 
is the product of the probabilities.  See M.G. BULMER, PRINCIPLES OF STATISTICS 15-22 (1979).  The 
probability that in all three cases the natural ailment would kill the plaintiff is 0.244.  Accordingly, the 
probability of at least one death having resulted from negligence is:  1 – 0.244 = 75.6%.  This simply means 
that on a repeating basis, negligence causes harms even if the individual probability is small because the small 
chance of a bad thing, if repeated, eventually catches up.  This is also the reason why the loss-of-chance 
doctrine is a sensible rule of law addressing the problem of medical malpractice in cases where patients are 
severely ill in the first place. 
 9. The loss-of-chance doctrine extends only to medical malpractice actions.  See Matsuyama, 890 
N.E.2d at 834 (“We emphasize that our decision today is limited to loss of chance in medical malpractice 
actions.”). 
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exception to the traditional causation analysis, and provides an alternative 
theory of liability for medical malpractice.  The doctrine recognizes that a 
plaintiff’s loss of probabilistic chance to survive should be a cognizable 
injury.10  Courts provide an award of damages based on this probabilistic loss 
of chance. 
The Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts in Matsuyama provides a five-
step process for calculating damages.11  The jury must find these facts: 
 
(1) “the full amount of damages allowable for the injury,” without any 
probabilistic offset; 
(2) the probability of survival before the medical malpractice; 
(3) the probability of survival after the medical malpractice; 
(4) the difference in probabilities between steps (2) and (3); and 
(5) the product of the difference in probabilities (4) and the full amount of 
damages (1). 
 
We can generalize this rule of law with this formula: 
 
 
where  J =  award of damages 
 D = full damages 
 P = pre-negligence chance of survival 
 R = post-negligence residual chance of survival 
 
The court provides the following numeric example to illustrate the damage 
calculation:  The full value of a wrongful death is $600,000.  The patient had a 
45% chance of survival before the medical practice.  The patient had a 15% 
chance of survival after the medical malpractice.  Based on the reduction of 
30% chance of survival, the court suggests that the damage for loss of chance 
is:  30% (reduction in chance) x $600,000 (full loss) = $180,000 (damages).12 
A number of other courts have adopted the same approach toward damage 
calculations.13  For example, in McKellips v. Saint Francis Hospital, Inc., the 
Supreme Court of Oklahoma gave this example:  The full value of a wrongful 
death is $500,000.  The patient had a 40% chance of survival before the 
medical malpractice.  The patient had a 25% chance of survival after the 
medical malpractice.  Based on the 15% reduction of chance of survival, the 
court suggested that the damage for loss of chance is $75,000 (= 15% x 
 
 10. See generally King, supra note 3 (defining loss-of-chance cause of action). 
 11. See Matsuyama, 890 N.E.2d at 840. 
 12. Id. 
 13. See supra note 2 (listing courts adopting loss-of-chance approach). 
J = D x (P – R) 
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$500,000).14  Indeed, this method in McKellips has influenced a number of 
subsequent decisions, including Matsuyama.15 
The above damage calculation method is a common approach taken by 
courts in conceptualizing causation analysis and damage calculation.  This 
approach is wrong.  In fact, for reasons explained below, the damages in the 
above hypotheticals should be $211,765 in the Matsuyama hypothetical16 and 
$100,000 in the McKellips hypothetical.17 
The Matsuyama court and other courts have incorrectly calculated 
probabilistic causation and the damage calculations derived therefrom.  The 
method of calculation endorsed in these cases is correct only in the special case 
when malpractice reduced the chance of survival to zero.  If the malpractice 
still left a residual chance of survival (as seen in the hypotheticals above), then 
as a matter of mathematics and probability, the method of damage calculation 
adopted by the courts is incorrect. 
THE SPECIAL CASE OF ZERO CHANCE OF SURVIVAL 
When medical malpractice reduces a less-than-probable chance of survival 
to zero chance of survival, the proper damage amount is the reduction in the 
chance of survival multiplied by the full value of the loss.  In these cases, the 
Matsuyama and McKellips method produces the correct result.  For example, 
assume the following:  (1) full value of loss is $600,000; (2) the chance of 
survival before the negligence is 30%; and (3) the chance of survival after the 
negligence is 0%.  The damage calculation is:  30% (reduction in chance) x 
$600,000 (full loss) = $180,000 (damages). 
In calculating the percentage decrease in the probability of survival due to 
negligence, we first need the reference class (the denominator in the fraction).  
Logically, the denominator is the number of people who died:  The reference 
class is based on the number of people who died from either the natural ailment 
condition or the malpractice.  This constitutes the 100%⎯another way to say 
this is that all deaths are explained as having been caused by a natural condition 
or by negligence.  The numerator is the number of people who died from the 
negligence, and this fraction calculates the damages based on probabilistic 
causation. 
An easier way to think about this situation in probabilistic terms is to 
imagine 100 people in the identical position.  Irrespective of any negligence, 
 
 14. McKellips v. Saint Francis Hosp., Inc., 741 P.2d 467, 476-77 (Okla. 1987). 
 15. See Matsuyama v. Birnbaum, 890 N.E.2d 819, 840 (Mass. 2008) (citing McKellips); see also Cahoon 
v. Cummings, 734 N.E.2d 535, 540-41 (Ind. 2000) (same); Perez v. Las Vegas Med. Ctr., 805 P.2d 589, 592 
(Nev. 1991) (same); Alberts v. Schultz, 975 P.2d 1279, 1287 (N.M. 1999) (same); Roberts v. Ohio Permanente 
Med. Grp., Inc., 668 N.E.2d 480, 484-85 (Ohio 1996) (same). 
 16. This value is calculated as:  $211,765 = (30% ÷ 85%) x $600,000. 
 17. This value is calculated as:  $100,000 = (15% ÷ 75%) x $500,000. 
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how many of these people would have died naturally from the ailment?  
Seventy people.  How many died from the malpractice?  Thirty people.  What 
is the probabilistic causation attributable to the negligent doctor?  The answer 
must be 30%, calculated as 30/100.  Thus, the damage calculation based on 
$600,000 full loss must be $180,000 (= 30% x $600,000). 
We can generalize the special case where the negligence reduces the pre-
negligence chance of survival to zero (death is certain after the negligence) as 
the following: 
 
 
where  J =  award of damages 
 D = full damages 
 P = pre-negligence chance of survival 
 
This method is seen in Matsuyama and other cases.  In Matsuyama, the 
damage calculation formula was:  J = D x (P — R), but since R = 0 in the 
special case, the formula reduces to:  J = D x P.  This method applies only 
when there is no residual chance of survival.  Otherwise, the application of this 
method is an error as a matter of probability analysis. 
THE NORMAL CASE OF RESIDUAL CHANCE OF SURVIVAL 
When malpractice reduces a less-than-probable chance of survival but there 
still remains a residual chance of survival after the negligence,18 the proper 
damage amount cannot be the product of the reduction in the chance of survival 
and the full value of the loss.  For example, assume the exact hypothetical 
provided in Matsuyama:  (1) full value of loss is $600,000; (2) the chance of 
survival before the negligence is 45%; and (3) the chance of survival after the 
negligence is 15%, which is the residual chance of survival after the 
negligence.  The damage cannot be $180,000 (= 30% x $600,000) as 
Matsuyama suggests. 
To see why, again imagine 100 people in the plaintiff’s exact situation.  How 
many of these people would have died naturally from the ailment?  Fifty-five 
people, because the plaintiff had a 45% chance of survival before the 
malpractice.  How many would have died from the malpractice?  Thirty people, 
because the doctor reduced the chance of survival from 45% to 15%.  How 
many people would have survived despite the negligence?  Fifteen people, 
because there is still a 15% residual chance of survival after the negligence.  
Because these 15 people would have survived the natural ailment and the 
 
 18. See, e.g., Herskovits v. Grp. Health Coop., 664 P.2d 474, 475 (Wash. 1983) (en banc) (negligence 
reduced chance of survival from 39% to 25%, and plaintiff subsequently died).  I call this the “normal” case 
because my intuition is that most patients still have some residual chance of survival even after the negligence. 
J = D x P 
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malpractice, they would have no injury and thus no legal claim.  How many 
people would have died in total?  Eighty-five people. 
The reference class from which probability is calculated must be all injured 
people, which is 85 people and not 100 people.  Of these unfortunate 85 people, 
55 died from the natural ailment, and 30 died from the malpractice. 
What, then, is the probabilistic causation attributable to the negligent doctor?  
The answer clearly cannot be 30%.  The probabilistic causation attributable to 
the doctor’s negligence must be:  30/85 = 35.3%.  Thus, the damage calculation 
must be:  35.3% (reduction in chance) x $600,000 (full loss) = $211,765 
(damages).  The error in the hypothetical resulted in an undervaluation of 
damages of $31,765. 
The Matsuyama decision confirms its error in discussing the specific facts of 
the case.  The plaintiff had a pre-negligence chance of survival of 37.5% and 
$875,000 full value of damages.19  The plaintiff had a 0% to 5% post-
negligence chance of survival.20  The court suggested that the actual post-
negligence chance of survival was an important fact that the trial court should 
have considered, which is correct as a general application of the rule, but the 
court used an incorrect statistical reasoning to explain why the datum is 
important.  The court opined that a 5% residual chance of survival would cause 
a 32.5% loss of chance, rather than 37.5%, decreasing damages from $328,125 
(= 37.5% x $875,000) to $284,375 (= 32.5% x $875,000).21  As explained 
above, this is the wrong analysis of the plaintiff’s actual damages.  If there is a 
finding that the plaintiff had a 5% residual chance of survival, the probabilistic 
causation attributable to the defendant’s negligence would be:  32.5% ÷ 95% = 
34.2%.  Thus, the damages are:  34.2% x $875,000 = $299,342. 
The error in Matsuyama produces only a small difference between the 
erroneous damages and correct damages because the residual chance was so 
small.  In other cases where the residual chance is large, the difference in 
damage amounts can be large.  Consider this hypothetical:  The plaintiff’s pre-
negligence chance of survival was 50%, and full damages are $600,000.  The 
defendant’s negligence reduces the chance of survival to only 10%.  The 
damages are $266,667 (= 40% ÷ 90% x $600,000).  However, if the 
defendant’s negligence reduces the chance of survival to only 40%, the 
damages are $100,000 (= 10% ÷ 60% x $600,000).  Thus, the residual chance 
of survival⎯which is an indicator of how the negligence took away the chance 
of survival⎯matters greatly in the damage calculation.22 
 
 19. Matsuyama, 890 N.E.2d at 827-28. 
 20. Id. at 845. 
 21. Matsuyama v. Birnbaum, 890 N.E.2d 819, 845 n.55 (Mass. 2008). 
 22. My colleague Andrew Blair-Stanek provided this additional analysis in a conversation.  Suppose a 
doctor misdiagnoses 100 identical patients:  Each patient had a life worth $1 million, a 50% chance of survival 
without the malpractice, and a residual post-negligence 15% chance of survival.  The doctor causes 35 
unnecessary deaths due to negligence.  The formula used by courts should result in the doctor paying a total of 
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We can generalize the rule of law for damage calculation when there is a 
post-negligence residual chance of survival: 
 
 
 
where  J =  award of damages 
 D = full damages 
 P = pre-negligence chance of survival 
 R = post-negligence residual chance of survival 
 
This formulation takes into account that a percentage of patients survive 
both the ailment and the negligence, and as a result they are not injured and 
cannot be plaintiffs.  These people must be excluded from the calculation of 
probabilistic causation. 
Note also that the above formula produces the same outcome as the formula 
used in the special case where there is no residual chance of survival (recall that 
the formula in the special case is J = D x P).  If R = 0, then the following must 
be true: 
 
 
 
Thus, my corrected formula should be the general rule of law applicable to 
both the special and normal cases. 
Lastly, I note that my formula requires no more additional factfinding or 
exceptional application of mathematical analysis by juries.  The math is basic 
elementary school arithmetic, and in any loss-of-chance case, juries are still 
required to find the pre- and post-negligence chance of survival:  The variables 
are still only D, P, and R.  As a matter of judicial administration, the only 
adjustment required is the application of a correctly stated and conceived 
formula to calculate probabilistic causation and damages. 
CONCLUDING THOUGHTS 
If courts adopt the loss-of-chance doctrine, and many do, they must award 
damages based on the probabilistic causal contribution of the defendant’s 
negligence to the plaintiff’s death.  Indeed, courts embrace this concept of 
 
$35 million, which is the harm to society.  The Matsuyama formula results in each dead patient getting $1M x 
(50% - 15%) = $350,000.  Because there are 85 dead patients, the doctor pays only 85 x $350,000 = $29.75 
million in total damages, instead of the $35 million.  Under the correct formula, each patient gets:  $1M x (50% 
- 15%) ÷ (100% - 15%) = $411,764.  If we multiply this amount by the 85 dead patients who can sue, it is $35 
million, which is the amount of damage the doctor caused to society. 
J = D x P – R 
1 – R 
D x P = D x  P – R 
1 – R 
  
46 SUFFOLK UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW ONLINE [Vol. I:39 
probabilistic causation and damages.23  How, then, did the courts err in the 
analysis?  The error in the mathematical logic arises from the choice of 
perspective on uncertainty.  Courts have conceptualized probabilistic causation 
from an ex ante perspective when in theory they should consider probabilities 
from an ex post perspective.24 
An ex ante perspective views the probability of an uncertain future event, 
through the concept of expected value.  Expected value is the chance of 
something occurring in the future given various potential outcomes.  
Probabilities are assigned to the various outcomes.  Mathematically, the 
calculation is simply the sum of the products of probabilities and outcomes:  
E(x) = P1 X1 + P2 X2 + . . . + Pn Xn where Pi is the probability given an outcome 
Xi. 
The logic of Matsuyama and other cases is apparent.  If we consider the 
potential future outcomes of medical malpractice and calculate an expected 
value, that calculation would be:  E(x) = P1 0 + P2 0 + P3 D where P1 is the 
probability of survival, P2 is the probability of death from the natural ailment, 
P3 is the probability of death from the negligence, and P1 + P2 + P3 = 1.  Since 
a plaintiff can recover nothing from surviving or death from natural causes, the 
expected value of a doctor’s negligence is E(x) = P3 D, which is what courts 
have adopted as the rule of law on damages. 
However, when a person dies, which is a precondition to bringing a medical 
malpractice claim for loss of chance, we are no longer concerned with various 
states of future outcomes including the possibility of survival, but instead we 
are looking back in time to the past.  The reference class is the group of dead 
plaintiffs, and should not include the class of people who survived (this last bit 
of uncertainty has been resolved).  We have a past occurrence of death, and we 
must assign only two probabilities:  P(d1) the probability that death resulted 
from the ailment, and P(d2) the probability that death resulted from negligence 
where P(d1) + P(d2) = 1.  The residual chance of survival must be taken out of 
the equation.  The causation analysis must answer the question:  Given that 
death occurred, what was the probability that it resulted from the negligence?  
Damages should follow therefrom. 
 
 
 23. See Matsuyama, 890 N.E.2d at 839 (“The formula aims to ensure that a defendant is liable in damages 
only for the monetary value of the portion of the decedent’s prospects that the defendant’s negligence 
destroyed.”); see also Cahoon v. Cummings, 734 N.E.2d 535, 541 (Ind. 2000) (holding damage calculation 
should not hold doctors liable beyond their own negligence); King, supra note 3, at 1382 (“A better method of 
valuation would measure a compensable chance as the percentage probability by which the defendant’s tortious 
conduct diminished the likelihood of achieving some more favorable outcome.”). 
 24. Cf. Chris Guthrie et al., Inside the Judicial Mind, 86 CORNELL L. REV. 777, 784 (2001) (suggesting 
judges subject to heuristics and biases that result in incorrect legal decisions). 
